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Rule 13.4 IDAHO COURT RULES Rule 1,J 
issued by the clerk of the court did not rein-
vest the trial court with jurisdiction to rule 
upon its own sua sponte motion to reconsider 
its prior order granting a new trial. Syth v. 
Parke, 121 Idaho 162, 823 P2d 766 (1991). 
Review of District Court's Order upon 
Remand. 
Although a district court's order upon re-
mand which dismissed one defendant in a 
two-defendant c~se, ordinarily would have 
required a certificate of finality for <lppel/-
review of the dismissal, the Supre111e r. "
1
(' 
d d h d
. . > d ,ll\fl·t 
eeme t e JStnct courts or er as f"unct · 
ll . I .fi IIHi-a y equ1va ent to a cert! cate of fi n2.Ji ! v 1 , 







when the appeal was initially filed and th,, 
court perceived no Just reason to delay con,· 
1
• 
eration on appeal of the dismissal order. Iii-\ 
sen v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare. j1;(; 
Idaho 758, 779 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989) 
Rule 13.4. Defogatfon of juri§diction to di§trict court during an 
appeat 
During a permissive appeal under Rule 12 I.A.R. or an appeal from a 
partial judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P., the Supreme 
Court may, by order, delegate jurisdiction to the district court to take spccilil'. 
actions and rule upon specific matters, which may include jurisdiction lo 
conduct a trial of issues. A motion for an order under this rule rnay be fil, •d 
wi th the Supreme Court by any party in the district court action or Ilic 
administrative proceeding. (Adopted March 27, 1989, effective July 1, 198!)· 






JR: l\.llle 13.5. §tJipufaHon frnr v acatforri., irever§a]l ort modnfi.cation of l 'I 
judgment. 
Upon stipulation of a ll affected parties that a criminal or civi l judgment o/' 
the trial court or administrative agency may be vacated, reversed, modifi<~d 
1
_
1 or remanded for further hearings, the court may enter a n order accomp]i:;h-
ing the stipulated result without briefs, oral arg9111ent, or an opinion oft he 
court. An order entered by the court pursuant to such a s tipulation slrnll not 
be considered as precedent for any purpose other than a resolution of that. , . _ a 
appeal. The clerk of the court shall issue a remittitur for the order unrk r I 
Rule 38 in the s ame manner as a rernittitur on an opinion of the courl. 
(Adopt ed March 23, 1990, effective July 1, 1990; amended March 20, 19Dt , II 
effective July 1, 1991.) 
STATUTORY NOTE§ 
Compiler's Notes. The Supreme Court 1991 renumbered former Rule 33.l as J/111,-
Order of March 20, 1991, effective July 1, 13.5. 
Rule 14. Time for filing appeal§. 
All appeals permitted or authorized by these rules, except a s provided in 
Rule 12, shall be taken a nd made in the manner and within the time limits 
as follows: 
(a) Appeal§ From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter ofrighf. 
from the district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the dnle 
evidenced by the filing s tamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or 







Hule 14 IDAHO APPELLATE RULES Rule 14 
criminal action. The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in 
nn action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted; 
could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the 
action (except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
or motions regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal 
period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the 
clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. The time for an 
;1ppeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action is 
terminated by the filing ofa motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 
the judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence 
in the action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence 
commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order 
deciding such motion. In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is 
l'Jl J arged by the length of time the district court actually retains jurisdiction 
pursuant to Idaho Code. When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or 
places the defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall 
commence to run. Provided, if a criminal judgment imposes the sentence of 
death, the time within which to file a notice of appeal does not commence to 
run until the death warrant is signed and filed by the court. 
(b) Appeals JF'rcom.:1JtJ1 Aclminfotrative Agency. An appeal as a matter 
of' right from an administrative agency may be made only by physically filing 
a notice of appeal with the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial 
Commission within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of 
the clerk or secretary of the administrative agency on any decision, order or 
award appealable as a matter of right. The time for an appeal from such 
decision, order or award of the industrial commission is terminated by a 
timely motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision or order 
which, if granted, could affect the decision, order or award (except motions 
regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period com-
mences to run upon the date of the filing stamp on the order or decision 
denying such motion or the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. The 
lime for an appeal from such decision, order or award of the public utilities 
commission begins to run when an application for rehearing is denied, or, if 
the application is granted, after the date evidenced by the filing stamp on 
the decision on rehearing. (Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; 
amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1, 1978; amended April 3, 1981, 
e/Jective July 1, 1981; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1, 1983; 
nmended March 30, 1984, effective July 1, 1984; amended March 21, 2007, 
eflective July 1, 2007; amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010.) 
STATUTORY NOTE§ 
Compilet·';; Note5. The words in parenthe-
sr.,s so appeared in the rule as promulgated. 
567 
\ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this case, the State has conceded that, if the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in 
Padilla v. Kentucky1 applies to Mr. lcanovic's claims on appeal, the district court erred in 
dismissing Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief in light of the Padilla Opinion. 
(See Respondent's Brief, p.21 n.3.) The sole contention of the State on appeal is that 
the Padilla Opinion does not apply to Mr. lcanovic's case in light of the modified 
retroactivity analysis from Teague v. Lane,2 as adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Rhoades v. State.3 This means that the sole question presented on appeal for this 
Court's resolution is the limited legal question of what law applies to Mr. lcanovic's 
claims on appeal. Mr. lcanovic submits that, because Padilla clearly applies to 
Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is undisputed 
that the district court erred in dismissing his petition. 
First, the retroactivity analysis in Teague/Rhoades only comes into play when the 
decision in question is issued after the petitioner's underlying judgment of conviction 
has become final. Where the underlying judgment is not yet final at the time of the 
issuance of an opinion, that opinion applies to the case under well-established law. 
Because Mr. lcanovic's underlying conviction was not final at the time Padilla was 
issued, the Opinion in Padilla applies to Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition. 
1 Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). 
2 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
3 Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130 (2010). 
1 
Second, even if Mr. lcanovic's judgment of conviction was final at the time Padilla 
was issued, the Padilla Opinion would apply to Mr. lcanovic's case because the Padilla 
Opinion did not announce a new rule, but merely applied an old rule to a new set of 
factual circumstances. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, reviewing courts give 
retroactive application to a decision where an old rule is applied to a new set of facts, 
and therefore Padilla would apply to Mr. lcanovic's substantive claims in post-
conviction. 
Finally, even if the Padilla Opinion announced a new rule of law, under Idaho's 
independent review for retroactive application as set forth in Rhoades, Idaho's unique 
jurisprudence requires that such an alteration to the fundamental guarantee of 
competent counsel be deemed a watershed rule under Idaho law. Given this, 
Mr. lcanovic submits that the Padilla Opinion would apply to the resolution of the legal 
issues raised in his post-conviction petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. lcanovic's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. lcanovic's underlying judgment of conviction not final at the time of the 
issuance of the Padilla Opinion, rendering the Padilla Opinion controlling over 
Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claims and further rendering modified approach to 
the Teague analysis as adopted in Rhoades inapplicable to this case? 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the Teague/Rhoades standard for retroactivity applies 
to this case, did the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla articulate a new rule, or 
articulate an old rule applicable to a new set of facts? 
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the Padilla Court articulated a new rule, was this rule a 
watershed rule under Idaho's unique jurisprudence, therefore rendering the rule 




Mr. lcanovic's Underlying Judgment Of Conviction Was Not Final At The Time Of The 
Issuance Of The Padilla Opinion, Rendering The Padilla Opinion Controlling Over 
Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim And The Modified Approach To The Teague 
Analysis As Adopted In Rhoades Inapplicable To This Case 
A Introduction 
The State has asserted on appeal that the modified Teague standard, as 
articulated in Rhoades, applies to this Court's determination of what law to apply to the 
legal issues in this appeal. However, the State misses a critical point in the analysis -
that the Teague/Rhoades retroactivity analysis only applies where the defendant's 
underlying judgment of conviction is final at the time of the announcement of the 
precedent at issue. Where the defendant's underlying judgment is not yet final at the 
time of the issuance of an opinion, that opinion applies to the resolution of the 
underlying substantive issues. Because Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final at 
the time the Padilla Opinion was issued, it clearly applies to his post-conviction claims 
and to this Court's review under well-established law. 
B. The Standard For Whether The Retroactivity Analysis Under Teague/Rhoades 
Applies To The Determination Of The Law Governing A Case Is Whether The 
Opinion In Question Was Issued Before Or After The Defendant's Underlying 
Conviction Became Final Under State Law 
The modified standard from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), as applied in 
Idaho under Rhoades, only applies to cases where the defendant is seeking collateral 
review of a judgment and the underlying judgment was already final at the time of the 
lssuance of the opinion at issue. Where the underlying judgment of conviction is not 
4 
final at the time of the issuance of an opinion, stare decisis principles mandate that the 
opinion would apply to the defendant's post-conviction claims in such a case. 
In Rhoades v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court was confronted with the question 
of whether to apply the Teague standard to collateral review in cases where the 
defendant/petitioners' underlying judgments of conviction were final. See Rhoades v. 
State, 149 Idaho 130, 133-139 (2010). In Rhoades, the petitioners sought retroactive 
application of the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Ring v. Arizona4 to collateral review of 
the petitioners' sentences of death. Id. at 132. In each of the petitioners' cases, the 
underlying judgments of conviction were all final prior to the announcement of the Ring 
Opinion. Id. 
In explaining the crux of the Teague holding, the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Rhoades correctly recognized that the retroactivity principles from Teague only apply to 
those cases where the underlying judgment was already final at the time the case law in 
question was announced. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134, 138. The Rhoades Court held 
that, "Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applicable to 
those cases that have become final before the new rule was announced." Id. at 
134 (emphasis added). Further, the Rhoades Court noted that previous Idaho cases 
restricting retroactive application of precedent were limited to cases where the 
defendant's judgment was final before the issuance of the opinion at issue. Id. at 136-
138. Additionally, the Rhoades Court emphasized policies regarding finality of 
judgments when adopting the modified Teague standard articulated in Rhoades. Id. at 
138. 
4 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
5 
This is consistent with the express terms of the Teague Opinion itself. From the 
outset, the retroactivity question addressed by Teague is limited to those cases that 
were final at the time the decision in question was announced. This is encapsulated in 
the Teague Court's own definition of what it means to be a new rule, holding that "a 
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the 
time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 302 (emphasis 
added). Additionally, the Teague Court noted what it means for an underlying judgment 
of conviction to be "final" for purposes of retroactivity analyses. A judgment is final for 
such purposes where, "the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of 
appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had lapsed." Id. at 295 
(quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258, n.1 (1986)) (emphasis added). This is 
consistent with the manner in which Idaho courts determine the finality of judgment, 
finding that a judgment becomes final upon expiration of the time in which to appeal if 
no appeal is actually taken from the underlying judgment. See, e.g., State v. Jakoski, 
139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) (noting that the defendant's conviction became final 
following the expiration of his time to appeal from his judgment in light of the 
defendant's failure to appeal). 
With regard to those cases where the defendant's underlying judgment of 
conviction was not yet final at the time the case law in question was issued, that case 
generally must have retroactive application - both on direct and collateral review. The 
Court in Teague noted that, under its prior opinion in Griffith v. Kentucky, "a new rule for 
the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state 
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in 
6 
which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 304-305 
(quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)) (emphasis added). 
That an underlying judgment is not final until the expiration of the time to file a 
direct appeal is further articulated under the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Jiminez v. 
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009). In Jiminez, the Court held that finality of judgments, 
for purposes of collateral review under federal habeas, is expressly defined as, "the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 
Id. at 119 (emphasis added). Until the expiration of the time in which a defendant may 
seek direct review, "the 'process of direct review' has not 'com[e] to an end' and 'a 
presumption of finality and legality' cannot yet have 'attache[d] to the conviction and 
sentence."' Id. at 119-120 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,887 (1983)); see 
also Caspari v. Bolen, 510 U.S. 383, 390-391 (1994) (defendant's underlying conviction 
was not final for purposes of retroactivity until availability of direct appeal was 
exhausted). 
The Griffith standard for retroactive application of precedent to cases where the 
underlying judgment is not yet final has also been expressly adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in determining whether case law applies to cases not yet final at the 
time of issuance of the opinion. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 
(201 O); State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 795 (1993). Idaho appellate courts have 
consistently articulated that, where the case law in question is announced prior to the 
underlying judgment of conviction becoming final, even cases articulating a new rule for 
the conduct of criminal proceedings must be applied in resolving the substantive issues 
7 
presented by such a case. See, e.g., Frederick, 149 Idaho at 515; State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,228 (2010); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-419 (1991). 
While the State has suggested to this Court that the retroactivity question turns 
on the time of the alleged error, rather than on the time at which the defendant's 
underlying conviction has become final, the United States Supreme Court has already 
considered - and rejected - similar claims in reviewing the applicability of Teague. See 
Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 81-85 (1994) (see also Respondent's Brief, p.17 
(tacking applicability of Padilla Opinion to the time at which trial counsel provides advice 
regarding entry of plea)). In Powell, the Nevada Supreme Court had held that a U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion regarding constitutional requirements for probable cause 
determinations did not apply to the defendant's case because the opinion was issued 
after the defendant's arrest. Id. at 83. Thus, the underlying Nevada opinion used the 
time of the alleged constitutional violation as the point at which to measure retroactivity, 
rather than the point in time at which the defendant's underlying conviction was final. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Powell held this was error. The question for whether 
the retroactivity analysis from Teague applied was whether the defendant's conviction 
was final at the time that the opinion at issue was announced - not whether the 
precedent existed at the time of the alleged violation. Powell, 511 U.S. at 84-85 
(emphasis added). In cases where the underlying conviction was not yet final at the 
time the rule is announced, the standard from Griffith controls and the defendant is 
entitled to the benefit of that rule. Id. 
C. Mr. lcanovic's Underlying Judgment Of Conviction Was Not Final At The Time 
The Opinion In Padilla Was Issued, And Therefore Padilla Governs His Claims 
On Appeal 
8 
From the outset, the State in this case has never asserted that Mr. lcanovic's 
underlying judgment of conviction was final at the time Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S. 
__ , 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) was announced, which is a condition precedent to the 
applicability of the retroactivity standards contained within the Teague/Rhoades 
analysis. (See Respondent's Brief, generally.) This is likely because Mr. lcanovic's 
underlying judgment of conviction was not final at the time Padilla was issued, and 
therefore Padilla applies to Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claim under Idaho law. 
It is undisputed, and was previously found by the district court in this case, that, 
while Mr. lcanovic's underlying judgment of conviction was entered on 
September 2, 2009, the district court retained jurisdiction over his case, and the court 
did not enter its order placing Mr. lcanovic on probation until February 18, 2010 - within 
the court's period of retained jurisdiction.5 (R., pp.4-5, 7-8, 15-16.) Under Idaho law 
that was operative at the time, Mr. lcanovic's judgment of conviction was not final until 
42 days from the court's order placing him on probation. Because the Padilla Opinion 
was issued prior to the expiration of 42 days from the court's probation order, this 
Opinion applies to Mr. lcanovic's contentions within his post-conviction petition. 
Under the version of I.AR. 14(a) that was operative throughout Mr. lcanovic's 
underlying criminal proceedings, the act of retaining jurisdiction by the district court 
tolled the time from which to appeal from any substantive issues relating to an 
5 This Court may wish to note that the State has incorporated this same accounting of 
the underlying procedural facts in Mr. lcanovic's case in its Respondent's Brief. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.1.) 
9 
underlying judgment of conviction. See Appendix A 6 The version of Idaho Appellate 
Rule 14(a) that was operative at the time of the underlying criminal proceedings in 
Mr. lcanovic's case provided in pertinent part that: 
In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of 
time the district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code. 
When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the 
defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall 
commence to run. 
See 2010 (emphasis added) I.AR. 14(a)7, Appendix A 
Cases interpreting this provision uniformly held that the district court's action of 
retaining jurisdiction in a criminal case operated to toll the 42-day period in which to file 
an appeal from the underlying judgment until the expiration of the court's period of 
retained jurisdiction and the court's relinquishment of jurisdiction or grant of probation in 
that case. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 150 Idaho 446, 448 (Ct. App. 201 0); State v. 
Schultz, 147 Idaho 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 293 
(Ct. App. 1991). Thus, it is only after the expiration of the period of retained jurisdiction 
6 For ease of this Court's reference, the version of I.AR. 14 that existed at the time of 
the proceedings in Mr. lcanovic's case has been appended to this brief. 
7 This Court may wish to note that the provisions of I.AR. 14(a) with regard to the time 
within which to file an appeal where the district court has retained jurisdiction have since 
been altered. The current version of the rule provides that, "If, at the time of judgment, 
the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2601 (4), the length of 
time to file an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall be 
enlarged by the length of time between the entry of the judgment of conviction and entry 
of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on probation; provided, 
however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must be brought within 42 
days of that judgment." I.AR. 14(a). However, this revision does not apply to 
Mr. lcanovic's underlying criminal proceedings, as the amendment was not effective 
until July 1, 2011, which is well after both the district court's order retaining jurisdiction 
and the court's order placing Mr. lcanovic on probation; and further because 
"[p]rocedural rules in criminal cases that could affect substantial rights" are given 
prospective, rather than retroactive application. See, e.g., State v. McLeskey, 138 
Idaho 691, 695 (2003). 
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that the time to file a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment began to run under 
the version of I.AR. 14 that was operative at the time of the criminal proceedings in 
Mr. lcanovic's case. Id. 
The district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. lcanovic's case, and did not enter 
its order placing him on probation until February 18, 2010. (R., pp.4-5, 7-8, 15-16.) 
Therefore, Mr. lcanovic had 42 days from the date the district court placed him on 
probation before his underlying judgment of conviction became final under Teague. 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 295. Under the law operative at the time, the date upon which 
Mr. lcanovic's conviction became final was April 1, 2010 - 42 days from the district 
court's order placing him on probation. Although by the slimmest of margins, 
Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final on the date the Padilla Opinion was 
announced on March 31, 2010. Given that Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final at 
the time of the Padilla Opinion, this Opinion applies to his post-conviction claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under well-established principles of retroactivity. See 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 304-305; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328. 
II. 
Assuming, Arguendo, That The Teague/Rhoades Standard For Retroactivity Applies To 
This Case, The U.S. Supreme Court In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But 
Rather Articulated An Old Rule Applicable To A New Set Of Facts. And Therefore The 
Padilla Opinion Governs Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim 
A. Introduction 
The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla did not announce a new rule of law. 
Rather, this Opinion was nothing more than the application of prior, well-established 
case law to a new set of facts. The Padilla Opinion was merely a further elaboration of 
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entrenched legal principles from the Court's prior Opinions in Strickland v. Washington, 8 
Hill v. Lockhart9, and I.N.S. v. St. Cyr10. Because Padilla did not announce a new rule, 
but instead merely applied well-established legal principles to new facts, the Opinion 
should be given retroactive application by this Court. 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But Rather 
Articulated An Old Rule Applicable To A New Set Of Facts, And Therefore The 
Padilla Opinion Governs Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim 
1. Under The Federal Standard For Whether A Rule Constitutes A "New 
Rule" For Purposes Of Retroactivity Analysis, The U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinion In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But Merely Applied Well-
Established Case Law To A New Set Of Facts, Thus Rendering 
Retroactive Application Appropriate 
Mr. lcanovic asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla did not 
announce a new rule of law, and therefore this Opinion applies retroactively. 
As has been noted, Padilla existed prior to the time that Mr. lcanovic's underlying 
judgment of conviction became final, and therefore it applied to the post-conviction 
proceedings relating to that judgment. However, even assuming that Mr. lcanovic's 
underlying judgment of conviction was final at the time the Padilla Opinion was 
announced, he asserts that Padilla did not announce a new rule, and therefore the 
Opinion would apply to resolve the underlying issue in Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated the three-part analysis under Teague in 
order to determine the retroactive application of a rule of law: 
In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief, a 
federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps. First, the 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
10 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's conviction and 
sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, the court must 
"[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed," and "determine whether 
a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction 
became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude 
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution." Finally, even if 
the court determines that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule, 
the court must decide whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow 
exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle. 
Caspari v. Bolen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 
Under the retroactivity standard articulated in Teague, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure are not applicable to cases that have become final before the new 
rules were announced. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. "[A] case announces a new rule if 
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction 
became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. "Under the Teague framework, an old rule 
applies on both direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally only applicable 
to cases that are still under direct review." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 
(2007). Put another way, if a case does not announce a new rule, but rather applies a 
well-established rule to a new set of facts, then the opinion is to be applied retroactively. 
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380-381 (2000). 
At base, the Padilla Opinion is nothing more than the application of legal 
principles that were well-established at the time of the Opinion to the set of facts that 
were before the court. Three primary cases that pre-dated Padilla formed the primary 
substance of the Opinion's rationale, and dictated the result in the Padilla case. First 
and foremost, the Padilla Opinion is nothing more than a straight application of the 
general principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which has long been the 
13 
standard by which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been measured. 
See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486. 
Mr. lcanovic contends that the analysis from the United States Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Taylor is controlling on this point. The Williams Opinion dealt with the issue 
of whether a refinement of Strickland was "clearly established precedent" for purposes 
of federal review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 379-380. While the Williams decision was rendered in the context 
of AEDPA, the Court was clear that the standards codified by this act were the same as 
those employed in Teague for determining whether an opinion announced a new rule of 
law. Id. at 380 ("It is perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that 
Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of 
law not clearly established at the time the state conviction became final."). In light of 
this, the Williams Court applied the same analysis as Teague to the question of whether 
the refinement to Strickland at issue was clearly established law. 
As a starting point, the Court in Williams recognized that old rules under Teague 
may be sufficiently clear even if these rules are expressed in terms of a generalized 
standard as opposed to a bright-line rule: 
If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case 
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific 
applications without saying that those applications themselves create a 
new rule .... Where the beginning point is a rule of this general 
application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a 
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a 
result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by 
precedent. 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 382 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992) 
(KENNEDY, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). 
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Thereafter, the Williams Court concluded that the general rule provided in 
Strickland for measuring whether a defendant has received constitutionally adequate 
counsel fell squarely within such a category: 
It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as "clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States." That the Strickland test "of necessity requires a case-by-
case examination of the evidence," obviates neither the clarity of the rule 
nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as "established" by this 
Court. This Court's precedent "dictated" that the Virginia Supreme Court 
apply the Strickland test at the time that court entertained Williams' 
ineffective-assistance claim. And it can be hardly said that recognizing the 
right to effective assistance of counsel "breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation on the States." 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (internal citations omitted). 
Padilla was, by the express terms of the Opinion itself, nothing more than a 
straight-forward application of Strickland to the facts in the defendant's case. See 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486. This was merely the Court applying a general standard 
that inherently required a case-by-case analysis in practical application. Under 
Williams, such an opinion does not articulate a new rule, but rather applies well-
established legal standards to a novel factual situation. See also U.S. v. Orocio, 645 
F.3d 630, 638-639 (3d. Cir. 2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903 
(Mass. 2011) (holding that the analysis in Padilla was, "the definitive application of an 
established constitutional standard on a case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving 
professional norms ... to new facts," and that it was therefore not a new rule.). In such 
cases, retroactive application of the rule is required. 
Additionally, the Padilla Court's application of Strickland was similarly dictated by 
two prior U.S. Supreme Court cases - Hill v. Lockhart and I.N.S. v. St. Cyr. Both of 
these cases were cited as authority underpinning the decision in Padilla. See Padilla, 
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130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486. In Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court extended its analysis under 
Strickland to challenges to guilty pleas based upon claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). And, in the subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion in /.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the Court elaborated on the interplay 
between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration consequences of such pleas. 
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-323 (2001). 
In fact, the Court in St. Cyr actually articulated the standards for competent 
counsel that would later be developed more fully in Padilla - noting both that the 
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice required that, "if a defendant 
would face deportation as a result of a conviction, defense counsel 'should fully advise 
the defendant of those consequences,"' and that "competent defense counsel, following 
the advice of numerous practice guides," would advice non-citizen clients of the 
immigration consequences of a plea. Id. at 322 n.48, 323 n.50. That the St. Cyr 
Opinion had already set out this standard for competent representation of counsel was 
expressly noted by the Padilla Court. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. The Padilla Opinion 
did not announce any new rule, but merely merged its prior statements in Strickland, 
Hill, and St. Cyrto hold that competent defense counsel must advise a non-citizen client 
as to the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Because this is merely the 
application of well-established case law to a new factual context, the Padilla Opinion did 
not announce a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. See also Orocio, 645 F .3d at 
639. 
That Padilla did not announce a new rule is also apparent from other aspects of 
the Padilla Opinion itself. First, Jose Padilla himself received the benefit of the U.S. 
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Supreme Court's Opinion. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. This direct application of the rule 
announced in the Padilla Opinion, without reference to the Teague analysis of 
retroactivity, has been held to be an important indicator that the Padilla Court did not 
consider this Opinion to articulate a "new rule." See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 954 
N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011 ). 
Second, the terms of the Opinion demonstrate that the Court contemplated the 
retroactive applicability of its decision. The Padilla Court expressly addressed concerns 
raised by the Solicitor General regarding the displacement of those convictions already 
final that were obtained through guilty pleas. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484-1485. Yet, 
rather than respond by stating that the Opinion would not have retroactive application, 
the Court instead responded that the impact of retroactive application would likely be 
minimal. Id. Citing to the absence of a "flood" of litigation in prior cases expanding 
upon Strickland, and to the high bar set by the Strickland standard itself, the Padilla 
Court concluded that lower courts would be able, under the circumstances identified by 
the Solicitor General, to effectively employ the Strickland framework "to separate 
specious claims from those with substantial merit." Id. Finally, the Padilla Court 
expressed skepticism that many final convictions would be disturbed upon retroactive 
application, as the standards articulated in the Opinion had been recognized under 
"professional norms" for "at least the past 15 years." Id. This implicit recognition of 
retroactive application of the Padilla Opinion has frequently been cited as an important 
indication that Padilla did not announce a new rule. See, e.g., Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d at 
377-378; Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 903; Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2011 ); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
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This is further consistent with numerous opinions that have determined that the 
Padilla Opinion does not announce a new rule of law, and therefore has retroactive 
application. See, e.g., Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637-640; Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d at 377-378; 
Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 896-904; Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570; Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 
at 809; Ex Parte De Los Reyes, 350 S.W.3d 723, 728-729 (Tex. App. 2011). 
2. Even If The Padilla Opinion Announced A "New Rule" Under The Federal 
Standard For Purposes Of Retroactivity, Under Idaho's Unique 
Jurisprudence. The Padilla Opinion Did Not Announce A New Rule Given 
Our Independent Retroactivity Analysis Pursuant To Rhoades 
While the State relies very heavily on two federal cases finding that Padilla 
articulated a new rule, Mr. lcanovic asserts that these federal cases are of very little 
assistance to this Court in its own retroactivity review. This is due to the independent 
analysis that this Court conducts regarding whether a rule constitutes a "new rule" for 
retroactivity purposes. 
Consistent with federal courts, Idaho has provided for retroactive application of 
case law where the case in question did not announce a new rule of law, but merely 
clarified existing legal standards. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. But, under the Rhoades 
Opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that Idaho applies an independent test 
for whether a rule constitutes a "new rule" under Idaho's modified Teague analysis. 
The Rhoades Court expressly acknowledged the wide criticism levied against 
federal application of the Teague standard with regard to how narrowly these decisions 
view what constitutes a new rule of constitutional law. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139. 
The Court further recognized that the narrow construction common to the federal courts 
conducting habeas corpus review is largely based upon concerns against excessive 
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federal interference in state law determinations. Id. However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court, in reviewing state post-conviction actions, "does not have a similar concern for 
comity when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes 
of applying Teague." Id. at 139. 
Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that Idaho courts must 
independently review what constitutes a new rule, and whether a new rule is a 
watershed rule, in the exercise of "independent judgment, based upon concerns of this 
Court and the 'uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing 
jurisprudence."' Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139 (quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 
469, (2001)). And, under Idaho's unique jurisprudence, there is even greater reason for 
this Court to conclude that Padilla did not announce a new rule for retroactivity 
purposes. 
In various aspects, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes the intimate relation 
between a guilty plea in a criminal case and the immigration consequences that may 
flow therefrom. These consequences are "now virtually inevitable for a vast number of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. The "drastic measure" of 
deportation - the modern equivalent of banishment - as it exists now is described by 
the Padilla Court as follows: 
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe 
"penalty"; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although 
removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless 
intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And, 
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal 
nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, 
we find it "most difficult" to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the 
deportation context. Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen 
defendants facing a risk of deportation find it even more difficult. 
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Id. at 1481-1482 (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, likely in recognition of the changes in immigration law 
rendering deportation nearly inevitable for a vast number of noncitizen defendants, 
amended I.C.R. 11 in 2007 to require that district courts "inform all defendants that if the 
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual 
admissions could have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal 
citizenship in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship." 
I.C.R. 11 (d)(1 ). Idaho's establishment of this requirement as part of the entry of plea 
process pre-dates the issuance of the Padilla Opinion, and reflects our state's unique 
judgment as to the integral relation between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration 
consequences flowing therefrom. See also Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570 
(recognizing the pre-existing requirement for a trial court to advise a defendant 
regarding potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea as an indicator that the 
Padilla Opinion was not a "new rule" under Minnesota's independent Teague analysis.). 
The intimate connection between a guilty plea and resulting deportation 
consequences is further reflected in the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. 
Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 401-402 (Ct. App. 2008). Although acknowledging that 
immigration consequences of a felony conviction had been held to be "collateral" to the 
plea, the Court in Tinoco-Perez recognized that the relationship between a criminal 
conviction and resulting immigration consequences was a cognizable ground to request 
sentencing relief in a criminal case: 
Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is 
generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction, it 
is nevertheless a very significant consequence for the defendant. Indeed, 
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for many non-citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will 
be quite secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on the 
defendant's life and future. Therefore, the effect on immigration status is 
an appropriate consideration for the trial court in fashioning a sentence or 
considering Rule 35 relief. 
Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho at 402. The Court further tied the significance of immigration 
consequences resulting from criminal convictions to the decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court to amend the criminal rules to require that trial courts advise non-citizen 
defendants of the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 402 n.1. 
In light of Idaho's unique jurisprudence that had previously recognized the intimate ties 
between criminal convictions and immigration consequences resulting therefrom, 
Mr. lcanovic asserts that Padilla did not articulate a new rule under Rhoades. 
Additionally, the standards articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) for 
"The Defense Function" have traditionally carried great weight with Idaho appellate 
courts with regard to measuring contemporary standards for competency of counsel. In 
discussing specifically the right to competent counsel under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho 
State Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "As a beginning point to this 
inquiry, this Court recognized the American Bar Association's standards entitled 'The 
Defense Function."' Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 635 (1986). The ABA standards 
for defense counsel and for the conduct of criminal proceedings have retained a 
significant place in Idaho's jurisprudence with regard to measuring competent 
representation of trial counsel in numerous opinions, and have often been referred to as 
"the starting point" under our Idaho State Constitution in evaluating claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279-280 (1998); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8-9 (1975); 
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Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
411 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1981 ). 
The Padilla Court noted that, even prior to its Opinion, the American Bar 
Association had recognized the necessity of competent defense counsel to advise a 
non-citizen defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her plea. Padilla, 130 
S. Ct. at 1482. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the same in its prior Opinion in St. 
Cyr - which was issued nearly ten years prior to the Padilla Opinion. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 322 n.48. Because Idaho places special emphasis on the American Bar 
Association's promulgated standards for the conduct of criminal trials in determining our 
own state constitutional right to counsel, and because these standards recognized the 
necessity of competent counsel to advise a client regarding immigration consequences 
of a conviction well in advance of the Padilla Opinion, Mr. lcanovic asserts that our· 
unique jurisprudence would dictate that Padilla would not be considered a "new rule" 
under our independent state review for retroactivity. 
While the State places much reliance on an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion that 
had found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a judicial 
recommendation against deportation, Mr. lcanovic submits that this opinion was no 
longer controlling law given the intervening changes in the landscape of immigration 
law, and its intimate relation with criminal convictions, by the time the Padilla Opinion 
was issued. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) Specifically, the State relies upon the 
opinion in Retamoza v. State 11 to argue that Padilla articulated a new rule. However, 
Retamoza was rendered at a time when the interplay between criminal convictions and 
11 Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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immigration consequences was fundamentally different, and therefore the result from 
that case would not be clearly dictated in light of intervening changes to immigration law 
as it relates to criminal convictions. 
The Retamoza Opinion dealt with, inter a/ia, the issue of whether the petitioner's 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a judicial recommendation against 
deportation ( .. IRAD). Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 795. The Retamoza Court then 
determined that, because the opportunity for a JRAD dealt with deportation, and 
deportation was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not extend to the failure to inform the 
petitioner of the potential to seek a JRAD. Id. at 795-797. 
However, the Strickland analysis presupposes that trial counsel's obligations may 
shift and change over time, and is measured by the contemporaneous state of the law. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim "must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of 
the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."). Given the intervening 
changes to immigration law subsequent to Retamoza, it cannot be said that this opinion 
dictated the result in subsequent cases where the landscape of immigration law was 
drastically altered. 
The Retamoza Opinion was issued in 1994 - two years prior to a radical 
overhaul of immigration law so as to eliminate the authority of the Attorney General to 
grant discretionary relief from deportation in nearly all cases where the non-citizen has 
committed a felony offense. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480. As noted by the Padilla 
Court, after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, deportation is 
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"practically inevitable" for convictions for most felony offenses. Id.; see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b. The Padilla Court then expounded on the effect of these changes: 
Id. 
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes 
of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. 
These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, 
deportation is an integral part - indeed, sometimes the most important 
part - of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes. 
Additionally, the Padilla Opinion discussed specifically the fact that the JRAD 
provisions have been eliminated entirely as of 1990, thus eradicating one of the few 
mechanisms to avoid deportation. Id. Therefore, between the time of the acceptance of 
the plea at issue in Retamoza - 1988 - and the time of the underlying proceedings in 
Mr. lcanovic's case, the landscape of the immigration law had shifted to the point where 
there was neither the potential for him to seek a JRAD nor a grant of discretionary relief 
from the Attorney General. 
Moreover, the Retamoza Opinion was issued prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
opinion in St. Cyr, which noted that "competent defense counsel, following the advice of 
numerous practice guides," would advise clients regarding important immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50. This passage from the 
U.S. Supreme Court reflects directly the subsequent holding in Padilla, and therefore 
the holding in Retamoza would have been altered given this intervening law. 
Finally, whether the rule would encompass the overruling of prior precedent has 
not been deemed dispositive to the analysis in Idaho regarding whether an opinion 
articulates a new rule, or rather an old rule applied to a new set of facts. For example, 
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the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry found that it was not announcing a new rule even 
though the opinion itself overruled prior case law. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Perry expressly disavowed the standards articulated in the Court's 
prior decision of Smith v. State, 12 and yet this in no way precluded the Court from 
finding that the standards articulated in Perry were not "new" for purposes of retroactive 
application under Rhoades. Id. at 226- 228. This is consonant with the holding of other 
jurisdictions that have similarly recognized that the mere existence of conflicting 
authority does not necessarily mean that a rule is new. See Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 36; 
Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 568-570 (recognizing that Padilla did not announce a new rule 
even though it effectively overruled a prior state decision). Given this, the issue of 
whether or not the opinion in question overruled prior case law is not dispositive of the 
analysis in Idaho regarding whether an opinion articulates a new rule. 
Because Idaho does not necessarily apply the same exacting standards for what 
constitutes an old versus a new rule for purposes of retroactivity, Mr. lcanovic asserts 
that this Court should find that the decision in Padilla did not announce a new rule. He 
further notes that an appellate court in Minnesota - which has the same retroactivity 
analysis that was adopted by our Supreme Court in Rhoades - has l1eld that Padilla did 
not announce a new rule. See Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 568-570; see also Rhoades, 
149 Idaho 136 (adopting the modified Teague standard as adopted by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court). Given that Idaho has adopted the same modified standard for review 
as that applied by the appellate courts in Minnesota, Mr. lcanovic submits that this Court 
12 Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469 (1971). 
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should likewise find that Padilla did not announce a new rule under Idaho's unique 
jurisprudence. 
111. 
Assuming, Arguendo, Tl1at The Padilla Court Articulated A New Rule, This Rule 
Constitutes A Watershed Rule Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, Therefore 
Rendering The Rule In Padilla Subject To Retroactive Application By This Court 
A Introduction 
Under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to collateral challenges in post-
conviction, and particularly in light of Idaho's more expansive right to the competent 
representation of counsel, Mr. lcanovic submits that the decision in Padilla constituted a 
watershed rule. As such, even if the Padilla Opinion announced a new rule of law, this 
rule should be given retroactive application by this Court. 
B. Under Idaho's Modified Approach To The Teague Analysis, Idaho Courts Must 
Always Determine Whether The Unique Jurisprudence Of Idaho Requires A 
Different Result To The Retroactivity Analysis 
As was previously noted, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a modified form of 
the Teague analysis in Rhoades. See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 135-139. However, while 
same structural analysis applies in Idaho to issues of retroactivity in cases of a final 
judgment, the Rhoades Court did not adopt a reflexive application of Teague with 
regard to the meaning of the retroactivity standards at issue. 
Instead, the Rhoades Court accepted the invitation of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Danforth v. Minnesota to define each of the terms in the Teague analysis under state 
law. In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether state courts could modify 
the retroactivity analysis it had previously set forth in Teague in deciding whether to 
26 
apply new case law to a collateral challenge where the defendant's underlying 
conviction was already final. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267-269 (2008). 
The Danforth Opinion concluded that states were free to do so. Id. at 275-282. 
Upon remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth elected not to abandon 
the general standards of review under Teague in its entirety. Danforth v. State, 761 
N.W.2d 493, 495-500 (Minn. 2009). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized that a lock-step application of the federal standards regarding the Teague 
analysis might not be advisable in its state court determinations on collateral review. 
Therefore, the Danforth Court also held that Minnesota courts must independently 
review cases to determine whether fundamental fairness requires retroactive application 
of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 500. 
Following the lead of the Danforth Opinion, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
subsequent determination on remand to independently define the terms of the Teague 
analysis under state law, the Rhoades Court held that it is mandatory for a reviewing 
court in Idaho to "independently review requests for newly announced principles of law 
under the Teague standard": 
We now explicitly adopt the Teague standard in criminal cases on 
collateral review. Furthermore, we follow the lead of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and hold that Idaho courts must independently review 
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of 
law under the Teague standard. 
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136 (emphasis added). 
The Court in Rhoades explained why such independent review was necessary 
with regard to state post-conviction claims. First, the Court noted that, among the 
criticisms to the Teague approach was that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a 
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definition of a new rule that was overly broad, and therefore excluded most of the 
decisions issued with regard to constitutional questions. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138. 
Second, the Rhoades Court noted the common criticism in how narrowly the U.S. 
Supreme Court had defined the two exceptions providing retroactive application for new 
rules that were either "substantive rules" or "watershed rules." Id. Finally, and critically, 
the Rhoades Court acknowledged that the primary motivator for the strictness of the 
Teague standards under federal law was the concern against excessive interference on 
the part of the federal courts in state law determinations. The Rhoades Court expressly 
acknowledged that, in Idaho, "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity 
when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of 
applying Teague." Id. at 139. 
Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was, 
"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newly-
announced principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, 
and our long-standing jurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140. 
C. Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, And In Light Of The Salient Differences 
Between Collateral Review Under The UPCPA And Federal Habeas, The Padilla 
Opinion Announced A Watershed Rule Entitled To Retroactive Application Given 
Idaho's More Expansive Right To Counsel 
1. Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence UPCPA Requires A Lesser Standard For 
Watershed Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel, As These Claims Generally May Not Be Brought On Direct 
Appeal 
Mr. lcanovic asserts that, because under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with 
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should apply a lesser 
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standard for what constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas 
corpus review pursuant to Teague. This is because such claims generally can only be 
brought under Idaho law through a collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA), rather than being brought on direct appeal, and therefore the 
concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal standard for watershed rules do 
not apply. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Rhoades noted that only two exceptions apply to 
permit retroactive application of new rules of law under Teague - substantive rules of 
law, which encompass only those rules that place private, individual conduct beyond 
criminal proscription; and watershed rules of fundamental fairness. Rhoades, 149 Idaho 
at 138-139. But the Rhoades Court further noted that the federal courts have 
interpreted the exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court 
has found no watershed rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Id. 
The narrow manner in which the Teague Court interprets both exceptions is the 
direct result of concerns specific to the context of federal habeas corpus, and 
concomitant concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the 
finality of state court decisions. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-310. This is because federal 
habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing 
the merits of criminal trials,' but only 'to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice systems."' Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 (1992) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)). In fact, 
the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal 
habeas. See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975). This requirement 
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presupposes that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will 
have already obtained a ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state 
appellate courts from which his or her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth recognized that the unique nature of federal 
habeas corpus review may lead some states to apply a lesser standard of review for 
retroactivity in light of their own state post-conviction procedures. In fact, the Court 
noted that it was the unique nature of federal habeas corpus review that prompted the 
standards underpinning the Teague analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion 
makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal 
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in 
their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion." Danforth, 552 
U.S. at 277. In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so squarely the 
product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of 
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of 
comity might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader 
application of precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280. 
Idaho's unique jurisprudence regarding collateral challenges to criminal 
convictions under the UPCPA does not share in the salient features of collateral 
challenges under federal habeas that have motivated the federal courts to apply such 
rigid and incredibly narrow standards for a watershed rule for purposes of retroactivity. 
This is particularly the case with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
normally cannot be brought on direct review and must instead be brought through post-
conviction under Idaho's unique jurisprudence and statutory law. 
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In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both. 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory, 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is 
that resolution of such claims almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal, 
and therefore expansion of the record through post-conviction is usually required in 
order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551-
552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 
296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375-
376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to entertain 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal. 
Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549-
550; Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376. 
The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a 
petition for post-conviction relief, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the 
alleged deficiency relates directly to the private consultation occurring between an 
attorney and client regarding the decision whether to plead guilty. See Mitchell, 124 
Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring 
development outside the trial record typically include issues as to "the adequacy of 
counsel's communications with the defendant."). Under Idaho's unique post-conviction 
jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through collateral 
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attacks in post-conviction, rather on direct review, because they hinge on evidentiary 
matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for justiciability of 
such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as that present in federal habeas 
corpus - rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior proceedings in order to 
properly exhaust state remedies, these issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be raised in any proceeding other than a post-conviction petition under Idaho 
law. 
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue 
under federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior 
opportunity to litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction 
are almost always a defendant's first and sole state mechanism to raise claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described in Padilla, Mr. lcanovic asserts 
such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to 
be deemed a watershed rule. 
2. Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence With Regard To Our More Expansive State 
Statutory Right To Counsel Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed 
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is 
only guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. 
See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique 
jurisprudence provides a right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided 
solely under the federal constitution, and therefore reflects a heightened concern for 
protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law than inheres under the federal 
constitution. 
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In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the 
Idaho State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the 
assistance of counsel by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho, 
a criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person 
having his own counsel is so entitled," and is further entitled to the assistance of 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852, 
19-4904. Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment of counsel grants an 
indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in which 
retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282 
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel 
to appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance." 
Id. at 282; see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). In addition, Idaho 
provides for a more expansive right to counsel because Idaho recognizes the right to 
counsel in order to pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme 
Court - a right that was expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Compare Hernandez, 127 Idaho 687-688; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600, 610-616 (1974). 
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under 
our statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is 
quite significant with regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel, 
as the right to counsel in post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the 
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Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 
555-556 (1987). 
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is 
in place by statute in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does 
not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an 
atl'luent defendant may retain one for the proceeding in question. Id. at 556. 
'"The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal 
that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing 
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant 
an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the 
State's appellate process." Id. 
Thus, the federal standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than 
that afforded to defendants by statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains 
no guarantee that an indigent defendant has the same right to the representation of 
counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such a right by operation of I.C. § 19-
852. See also Young, 122 Idaho at 281-282. 
Moreover, once a statutory right to counsel has been conferred under Idaho law, 
this right carries with it all the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel as does the 
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State, 
127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995). As was noted by the Court in Hernandez, the "statutory 
right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to 
effective assistance of counsel." Id. Therefore, this Court treats the statutory grant of 
the right to counsel under Idaho law as inherently conferring the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Id. 
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Because Idaho provides for much broader protection of the right to counsel than 
that recognized under the federal constitution, Mr. lcanovic asserts that this Court 
should account for this heightened protection when reviewing retroactive application of 
new rules of law that involve the right to competent representation of counsel. This is 
particularly the case where the rule in question involves issues of critical importance to 
the competent representation of criminal defendants, as is the case with Padilla. 
The Court in Rhoades has indicated that the standard for watershed rules in 
Idaho encompasses review for whether the rule implicates the fundamental fairness of 
the proceedings, and that Idaho courts independently review whether a rule would meet 
this standard in light of Idaho's jurisprudence and our state constitutional standards. 
See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. In light of Idaho's more expansive right to counsel, 
both under our constitution and under our statutory laws, Mr. lcanovic asserts that the 
standards articulated for competent representation of counsel under Padilla should be 
deemed a watershed rule by this Court. 13 
13 This Court may also wish to note that, in the Minnesota Court of Appeals case of 
Campos v. State, the court indicated that, had the court not already determined that 
Padilla did not articulate a new rule, the Opinion may have been deemed a watershed 
rule implicating fundamental fairness under its modified Teague analysis pursuant to 
Danforth. See Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 571 n.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. lcanovic respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2012. 
SARAH E. TOMP~-lt;J 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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